Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2024-11 · 109 (3) · 897-912
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13084 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2024-06-11. Written by Douglas Blue. Cited 2 times so far (Crossref); 37 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
We argue that (1) a purported example of an infinite inference we humans can actually perform admits a faithful, finitary description, and (2) infinite inference contravenes any view which does not grant our minds uncomputable powers. These arguments block the strategy, dating back to Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language , of using infinitary inference rules to secure the determinacy of arithmetical truth on conventionalist grounds.
Cite
APA
Blue, D. (2024). Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 109(3), 897-912. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13084
Vancouver
Blue D. Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2024;109(3):897-912. doi:10.1111/phpr.13084
BibTeX
@article{Blue2024,
author = {Blue, Douglas},
title = {Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2024},
volume = {109},
number = {3},
pages = {897--912},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.13084}
}
EUVIMED