Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle's ethics
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2024-07 · 109 (1) · 179-203
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13032 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2023-10-12. Written by Patricia Marechal. Cited 4 times so far (Crossref); 98 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Topics: Ethik in der Pflege
Abstract (original language)
This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom ( phronēsis ) is a state of conviction ( pistis ) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise without virtuous dispositions to experience appropriate passions. Along the way, I argue that this reading allows us to explain the shortcomings of self‐controlled and akratic agents.
Cite
APA
Marechal, P. (2024). Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle's ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 109(1), 179-203. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13032
Vancouver
Marechal P. Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle's ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2024;109(1):179-203. doi:10.1111/phpr.13032
BibTeX
@article{Marechal2024,
author = {Marechal, Patricia},
title = {Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle's ethics},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2024},
volume = {109},
number = {1},
pages = {179--203},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.13032}
}
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