Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2024-05 · 108 (3) · 697-725
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13006 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2023-06-19. Written by Christopher Bottomley and 1 co-authors. Cited 16 times so far (Crossref); 50 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
No existing normative decision theory adequately handles risk. Expected Utility Theory is overly restrictive in prohibiting a range of reasonable preferences. And theories designed to accommodate such preferences (for example, Buchak's (2013) Risk‐Weighted Expected Utility Theory) violate the Betweenness axiom, which requires that you are indifferent to randomizing over two options between which you are already indifferent. Betweenness has been overlooked by philosophers, and we argue that it is a compelling normative constraint. Furthermore, neither Expected nor Risk‐Weighted Expected Utility Theory allow for stakes‐sensitive risk‐attitudes—they require that risk matters in the same way whether you are gambling for loose change or millions of dollars. We provide a novel normative interpretation of Weighted‐Linear Utility Theory that solves all of these problems.
Cite
APA
Bottomley, C., & Williamson, T. L. (2024). Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(3), 697-725. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13006
Vancouver
Bottomley C, Williamson TL. Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2024;108(3):697-725. doi:10.1111/phpr.13006
BibTeX
@article{Bottomley2024,
author = {Bottomley, Christopher and Williamson, Timothy Luke},
title = {Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2024},
volume = {108},
number = {3},
pages = {697--725},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.13006}
}
EUVIMED