Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2024-03 · 108 (2) · 396-413
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12978 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, published online on 2023-04-30. Written by David Thorstad. Cited 21 times so far (Crossref); 85 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
Bounded rationality gets a bad rap in epistemology. It is argued that theories of bounded rationality are overly context‐sensitive; conventionalist; or dependent on ordinary language (Carr, 2022; Pasnau, 2013). In this paper, I have three aims. The first is to set out and motivate an approach to bounded rationality in epistemology inspired by traditional theories of bounded rationality in cognitive science. My second aim is to show how this approach can answer recent challenges raised for theories of bounded rationality. My third aim is to clarify the role of rational ideals in bounded rationality.
Cite
APA
Thorstad, D. (2024). Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(2), 396-413. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12978
Vancouver
Thorstad D. Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2024;108(2):396-413. doi:10.1111/phpr.12978
BibTeX
@article{Thorstad2024,
author = {Thorstad, David},
title = {Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2024},
volume = {108},
number = {2},
pages = {396--413},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.12978}
}
EUVIMED