Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2024-03 · 108 (2) · 396-413
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12978 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, online erschienen am 30.04.2023. Verfasst von David Thorstad. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 21-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 85 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Bounded rationality gets a bad rap in epistemology. It is argued that theories of bounded rationality are overly context‐sensitive; conventionalist; or dependent on ordinary language (Carr, 2022; Pasnau, 2013). In this paper, I have three aims. The first is to set out and motivate an approach to bounded rationality in epistemology inspired by traditional theories of bounded rationality in cognitive science. My second aim is to show how this approach can answer recent challenges raised for theories of bounded rationality. My third aim is to clarify the role of rational ideals in bounded rationality.
Zitieren
APA
Thorstad, D. (2024). Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(2), 396-413. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12978
Vancouver
Thorstad D. Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2024;108(2):396-413. doi:10.1111/phpr.12978
BibTeX
@article{Thorstad2024,
author = {Thorstad, David},
title = {Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2024},
volume = {108},
number = {2},
pages = {396--413},
doi = {10.1111/phpr.12978}
}
EUVIMED