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Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist

Nomy Arpaly

Philosophical Issues · 2023-10 · 33 (1) · 22-32

DOI: 10.1111/phis.12239 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Philosophical Issues, published online on 2023-08-21. Written by Nomy Arpaly. Cited 14 times so far (Crossref); 20 references.

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Abstract (original language)

I argue that unless belief is voluntary in a very strict sense – that is, unless credence is simply under our direct control – there can be no practical reasons to believe. I defend this view against recent work by Susanna Rinard. I then argue that for very similar reasons, barring the truth of strict doxastic voluntarism, there cannot be epistemic reasons to act, only purely practical reasons possessed by those whose goal is attaining knowledge or justified belief.

Cite

APA

Arpaly, N. (2023). Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist. Philosophical Issues, 33(1), 22-32. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12239

Vancouver

Arpaly N. Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist. Philosophical Issues. 2023;33(1):22-32. doi:10.1111/phis.12239

BibTeX
@article{Arpaly2023,
  author = {Arpaly, Nomy},
  title = {Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist},
  journal = {Philosophical Issues},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {33},
  number = {1},
  pages = {22--32},
  doi = {10.1111/phis.12239}
}
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