“Free will” is vague
Philosophical Issues · 2023-10 · 33 (1) · 7-21
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12238 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophical Issues, published online on 2023-08-19. Written by Santiago Amaya. Cited 2 times so far (Crossref); 41 references.
Abstract (original language)
This paper argues that “free will” is vague. The argument has two steps. First, I argue that free will is a matter of degrees and, second, that there are no sharp boundaries separating free decisions and actions and non‐free ones. After presenting the argument, I focus on one significant consequence of the thesis, although others are mentioned along the way. In short, considerations of vagueness help understand the logic behind so‐called manipulation arguments, but also show why these arguments are ultimately flawed.
Cite
APA
Amaya, S. (2023). “Free will” is vague. Philosophical Issues, 33(1), 7-21. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12238
Vancouver
Amaya S. “Free will” is vague. Philosophical Issues. 2023;33(1):7-21. doi:10.1111/phis.12238
BibTeX
@article{Amaya2023,
author = {Amaya, Santiago},
title = {“Free will” is vague},
journal = {Philosophical Issues},
year = {2023},
volume = {33},
number = {1},
pages = {7--21},
doi = {10.1111/phis.12238}
}
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