Skepticism: Impractical, therefore implausible
Philosophical Issues · 2019-10 · 29 (1) · 143-158
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12145 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophical Issues, published online on 2019-09-02. Written by Michael Hannon. Cited 15 times so far (Crossref); 48 references.
Abstract (original language)
The truth of skepticism would be depressing and impractical. Our beliefs would be groundless, we would know nothing (or almost nothing) about the world around us, and epistemic success would likely be impossible. But do these negative consequences have any bearing on the truth of skepticism? According to many scholars, they do not. The impractical consequences of skepticism are typically regarded as orthogonal to its truth. For this reason, pragmatic resolutions to skepticism are regularly dismissed. I will argue, however, that skepticism is implausible because it is impractical. In particular, skepticism is implausible because it goes against the point of epistemic evaluation.
Cite
APA
Hannon, M. (2019). Skepticism: Impractical, therefore implausible. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), 143-158. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12145
Vancouver
Hannon M. Skepticism: Impractical, therefore implausible. Philosophical Issues. 2019;29(1):143-158. doi:10.1111/phis.12145
BibTeX
@article{Hannon2019,
author = {Hannon, Michael},
title = {Skepticism: Impractical, therefore implausible},
journal = {Philosophical Issues},
year = {2019},
volume = {29},
number = {1},
pages = {143--158},
doi = {10.1111/phis.12145}
}
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