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On the Epistemic Insignificance of Perceptual Phenomenology

Tim Butzer

Analytic Philosophy · 2026-03-01

DOI: 10.1111/phib.70004 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Analytic Philosophy, published online on 2026-03-01. Written by Tim Butzer. 26 references.

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Abstract (original language)

It is natural to think that phenomenology must play a central role in any epistemic account of perceptual warrant. I contend that this claim is mistaken. The thesis that I will advance is that the phenomenology of perceptual experiences is irrelevant to their ability to warrant perceptual beliefs. I present various problems for this approach, then consider various fallback positions available to the defender of the epistemic significance of phenomenology and conclude that whatever its place in our metaphysical understanding of the world, perceptual phenomenology is epistemically insignificant with regard to the project of explaining perceptual warrant.

Cite

APA

Butzer, T. (2026). On the Epistemic Insignificance of Perceptual Phenomenology. Analytic Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.70004

Vancouver

Butzer T. On the Epistemic Insignificance of Perceptual Phenomenology. Analytic Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.1111/phib.70004

BibTeX
@article{Butzer2026,
  author = {Butzer, Tim},
  title = {On the Epistemic Insignificance of Perceptual Phenomenology},
  journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/phib.70004}
}
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