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On the Epistemic Insignificance of Perceptual Phenomenology

Tim Butzer

Analytic Philosophy · 01.03.2026

DOI: 10.1111/phib.70004 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analytic Philosophy, online erschienen am 01.03.2026. Verfasst von Tim Butzer. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

It is natural to think that phenomenology must play a central role in any epistemic account of perceptual warrant. I contend that this claim is mistaken. The thesis that I will advance is that the phenomenology of perceptual experiences is irrelevant to their ability to warrant perceptual beliefs. I present various problems for this approach, then consider various fallback positions available to the defender of the epistemic significance of phenomenology and conclude that whatever its place in our metaphysical understanding of the world, perceptual phenomenology is epistemically insignificant with regard to the project of explaining perceptual warrant.

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APA

Butzer, T. (2026). On the Epistemic Insignificance of Perceptual Phenomenology. Analytic Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.70004

Vancouver

Butzer T. On the Epistemic Insignificance of Perceptual Phenomenology. Analytic Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.1111/phib.70004

BibTeX
@article{Butzer2026,
  author = {Butzer, Tim},
  title = {On the Epistemic Insignificance of Perceptual Phenomenology},
  journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/phib.70004}
}
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