Against normativism about mental attitudes
Analytic Philosophy · 2021-09 · 62 (3) · 295-311
DOI: 10.1111/phib.12243 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Analytic Philosophy, published online on 2021-07-27. Written by Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini. Cited 2 times so far (Crossref); 68 references.
Abstract (original language)
Normativists argue that the mind is essentially normative and any adequate account of our mental attitudes must involve normative terms and judgments. In particular, one brand of Normativism defends the claim that mental attitudes are defined by constitutive norms. Against this, Anti‐normativists have offered non‐normative accounts of mental states.The goal of this paper is to bolster Anti‐normativism by undermining one key argument in favor of Normativism.
Cite
APA
Ganapini, M. B. (2021). Against normativism about mental attitudes. Analytic Philosophy, 62(3), 295-311. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12243
Vancouver
Ganapini MB. Against normativism about mental attitudes. Analytic Philosophy. 2021;62(3):295-311. doi:10.1111/phib.12243
BibTeX
@article{Ganapini2021,
author = {Ganapini, Marianna Bergamaschi},
title = {Against normativism about mental attitudes},
journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
year = {2021},
volume = {62},
number = {3},
pages = {295--311},
doi = {10.1111/phib.12243}
}
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