Against normativism about mental attitudes
Analytic Philosophy · 2021-09 · 62 (3) · 295-311
DOI: 10.1111/phib.12243 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analytic Philosophy, online erschienen am 27.07.2021. Verfasst von Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 68 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Normativists argue that the mind is essentially normative and any adequate account of our mental attitudes must involve normative terms and judgments. In particular, one brand of Normativism defends the claim that mental attitudes are defined by constitutive norms. Against this, Anti‐normativists have offered non‐normative accounts of mental states.The goal of this paper is to bolster Anti‐normativism by undermining one key argument in favor of Normativism.
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APA
Ganapini, M. B. (2021). Against normativism about mental attitudes. Analytic Philosophy, 62(3), 295-311. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12243
Vancouver
Ganapini MB. Against normativism about mental attitudes. Analytic Philosophy. 2021;62(3):295-311. doi:10.1111/phib.12243
BibTeX
@article{Ganapini2021,
author = {Ganapini, Marianna Bergamaschi},
title = {Against normativism about mental attitudes},
journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
year = {2021},
volume = {62},
number = {3},
pages = {295--311},
doi = {10.1111/phib.12243}
}
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