Animal sentience
Philosophy Compass · 2022-05 · 17 (5)
DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12822 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy Compass, published online on 2022-03-17. Written by Heather Browning and 1 co-authors. Institution: Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science London School of Economics and Political Science London UK. Cited 113 times so far (Crossref); 133 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0). Funded by: H2020 European Research Council.
Abstract (original language)
‘Sentience’ sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy‐making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research.
Authors and institutions
- Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science London School of Economics and Political Science London UK.
ORCID profiles: Heather Browning, Jonathan Birch
Funding
- H2020 European Research Council
Cite
APA
Browning, H., & Birch, J. (2022). Animal sentience. Philosophy Compass, 17(5). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12822
Vancouver
Browning H, Birch J. Animal sentience. Philosophy Compass. 2022;17(5). doi:10.1111/phc3.12822
BibTeX
@article{Browning2022,
author = {Browning, Heather and Birch, Jonathan},
title = {Animal sentience},
journal = {Philosophy Compass},
year = {2022},
volume = {17},
number = {5},
doi = {10.1111/phc3.12822}
}
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