Unacknowledged Permissivism
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · 2020-03 · 101 (1) · 158-183
DOI: 10.1111/papq.12299 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 08.01.2020. Verfasst von Julia Jael Smith. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 36 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes towards some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an attractive view: It is compatible with the intuitive motivations for permissivism and avoids a significant challenge to permissivism: the arbitrariness objection.
Förderung
- Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Smith, J. J. (2020). Unacknowledged Permissivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 101(1), 158-183. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12299
Vancouver
Smith JJ. Unacknowledged Permissivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 2020;101(1):158-183. doi:10.1111/papq.12299
BibTeX
@article{Smith2020,
author = {Smith, Julia Jael},
title = {Unacknowledged Permissivism},
journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2020},
volume = {101},
number = {1},
pages = {158--183},
doi = {10.1111/papq.12299}
}
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