Empirical tests of scientific realism: A quantitative framework
Metaphilosophy · 2023-07 · 54 (4) · 507-522
DOI: 10.1111/meta.12641 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Metaphilosophy, published online on 2023-07-05. Written by James W. McAllister. Cited 3 times so far (Crossref); 51 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
The scientific realism debate in philosophy of science raises some intriguing methodological issues. Scientific realism posits a link between a scientific theory's observational and referential success. This opens the possibility of testing the thesis empirically, by searching for evidence of such a link in the record of theories put forward in the history of science. Many realist philosophers working today propose case study methodology as a way of carrying out such a test. This article argues that a qualitative method such as case study methodology is not adequate for this purpose, for two reasons: to test scientific realism is to pose an effects‐of‐causes question, and observational and referential success are quantities that theories possess to a greater or lesser degree. The article concludes that an empirical test of scientific realism requires a quantitative method.
Cite
APA
McAllister, J. W. (2023). Empirical tests of scientific realism: A quantitative framework. Metaphilosophy, 54(4), 507-522. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12641
Vancouver
McAllister JW. Empirical tests of scientific realism: A quantitative framework. Metaphilosophy. 2023;54(4):507-522. doi:10.1111/meta.12641
BibTeX
@article{McAllister2023,
author = {McAllister, James W.},
title = {Empirical tests of scientific realism: A quantitative framework},
journal = {Metaphilosophy},
year = {2023},
volume = {54},
number = {4},
pages = {507--522},
doi = {10.1111/meta.12641}
}
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