At a glance
Journal article in Metaphilosophy, published online on 2015-07-22. Written by Duncan Pritchard. Cited 82 times so far (Crossref); 60 references.
Abstract (original language)
In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti‐risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti‐luck condition. Second, to legal theory, where it is shown that this account of risk can cast light on the debate regarding the extent to which a criminal justice system can countenance the possibility of wrongful convictions.
Cite
APA
Pritchard, D. (2015). Risk. Metaphilosophy, 46(3), 436-461. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12142
Vancouver
Pritchard D. Risk. Metaphilosophy. 2015;46(3):436-461. doi:10.1111/meta.12142
BibTeX
@article{Pritchard2015,
author = {Pritchard, Duncan},
title = {Risk},
journal = {Metaphilosophy},
year = {2015},
volume = {46},
number = {3},
pages = {436--461},
doi = {10.1111/meta.12142}
}
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