Effects of Causal Attributions on Fairness Preferences and Generosity in Loss Sharing: An Ultimatum Game Experiment
Metroeconomica · 2026-07-12
DOI: 10.1111/meca.70026 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Metroeconomica, published online on 2026-07-12. Written by Dikla Elisha and 3 co-authors. 66 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
This study examines the effects of causal attributions (luck vs. effort), the cause of a loss (proposer vs. responder), and its type (individual vs. joint) on fairness preferences in loss sharing. In a loss ultimatum game with earned endowments ( N = 246), players were willing to pay more of the loss if their lack of effort caused it, rather than the UG partner's. No significant differences were found if the cause was bad luck. Players were willing to pay less if their bad luck caused the loss, and more if the UG partner's bad luck caused it, compared to lack of effort.
Cite
APA
Elisha, D., Malul, M., Rosenboim, M., & Yavneali, T. (2026). Effects of Causal Attributions on Fairness Preferences and Generosity in Loss Sharing: An Ultimatum Game Experiment. Metroeconomica. https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.70026
Vancouver
Elisha D, Malul M, Rosenboim M, Yavneali T. Effects of Causal Attributions on Fairness Preferences and Generosity in Loss Sharing: An Ultimatum Game Experiment. Metroeconomica. 2026. doi:10.1111/meca.70026
BibTeX
@article{Elisha2026,
author = {Elisha, Dikla and Malul, Miki and Rosenboim, Mosi and Yavneali, Tali},
title = {Effects of Causal Attributions on Fairness Preferences and Generosity in Loss Sharing: An Ultimatum Game Experiment},
journal = {Metroeconomica},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/meca.70026}
}
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