Artificial Intelligence R&D Investment With Wage Bargaining in a Duopoly
Metroeconomica · 2026-05-19
DOI: 10.1111/meca.70022 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Metroeconomica, published online on 2026-05-19. Written by Chaoqun Sun and 1 co-authors. 41 references.
Abstract (original language)
This study develops a duopoly model incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) R&D investment and wage bargaining to analyze firms' wage and AI investment decisions. The main findings are as follows: First, bargaining power and AI R&D investment efficiency affect equilibrium results regardless of bargaining function forms. Second, bargaining modes influence how AI R&D investment affects wages and firm behavior. Third, AI R&D investment decisions are jointly determined by bargaining mode, bargaining power and R&D investment efficiency. When high‐skilled labor and AI investment exist a complementary effect, worker welfare and social welfare remain unchanged under different bargaining modes.
Cite
APA
Sun, C., & Chen, J. (2026). Artificial Intelligence R&D Investment With Wage Bargaining in a Duopoly. Metroeconomica. https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.70022
Vancouver
Sun C, Chen J. Artificial Intelligence R&D Investment With Wage Bargaining in a Duopoly. Metroeconomica. 2026. doi:10.1111/meca.70022
BibTeX
@article{Sun2026,
author = {Sun, Chaoqun and Chen, Junlong},
title = {Artificial Intelligence R&D Investment With Wage Bargaining in a Duopoly},
journal = {Metroeconomica},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/meca.70022}
}
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