Licensing of a Drastic Innovation with Product Differentiation
The Manchester School · 2014-06 · 82 (3) · 296-321
DOI: 10.1111/manc.12025 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Manchester School, online erschienen am 04.07.2013. Verfasst von Toker Doganoglu und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 17 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Volkswagen Stiftung.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We analyze the licensing of a drastic innovation when products are differentiated due to consumer and/or product heterogeneity. We show that an industry insider prefers to divest its production arm and license the new technology as an industry outsider, in which case it can replicate multiproduct monopoly profit. We derive the optimal contracts and the optimal number of licenses by assuming a logit demand system. Optimal number of licenses, quite strikingly, increases when the technology has a higher relative value than a commercialized alternative. This result stands in sharp contrast with the literature on the licensing of a homogenous good.
Förderung
- Volkswagen Stiftung
Zitieren
APA
Doganoglu, T., & Inceoglu, F. (2014). Licensing of a Drastic Innovation with Product Differentiation. The Manchester School, 82(3), 296-321. https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12025
Vancouver
Doganoglu T, Inceoglu F. Licensing of a Drastic Innovation with Product Differentiation. The Manchester School. 2014;82(3):296-321. doi:10.1111/manc.12025
BibTeX
@article{Doganoglu2014,
author = {Doganoglu, Toker and Inceoglu, Firat},
title = {Licensing of a Drastic Innovation with Product Differentiation},
journal = {The Manchester School},
year = {2014},
volume = {82},
number = {3},
pages = {296--321},
doi = {10.1111/manc.12025}
}
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