Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency
Kyklos · 2020-02 · 73 (1) · 47-67
DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12215 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Kyklos, online erschienen am 09.12.2019. Verfasst von Cécile Bazart und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 16-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 42 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper reports an experimental test of the relative efficiency of a whistleblowing‐based audit scheme compared to a random‐based audit scheme. We design a between‐subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random‐based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing‐based audit scheme (i) improves the targeting of evaders, (ii) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, and (iii) raises the tax levy.
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APA
Bazart, C., Beaud, M., & Dubois, D. (2020). Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency. Kyklos, 73(1), 47-67. https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12215
Vancouver
Bazart C, Beaud M, Dubois D. Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency. Kyklos. 2020;73(1):47-67. doi:10.1111/kykl.12215
BibTeX
@article{Bazart2020,
author = {Bazart, Cécile and Beaud, Mickael and Dubois, Dimitri},
title = {Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency},
journal = {Kyklos},
year = {2020},
volume = {73},
number = {1},
pages = {47--67},
doi = {10.1111/kykl.12215}
}
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