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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Sustaining cooperation with correlated information: an experimental test

Yongping Bao, Fabian Dvorak, Sebastian Fehrler

Experimental Economics · 06.11.2026 · 1-18

DOI: 10.1017/eec.2026.10069 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Experimental Economics, online erschienen am 06.11.2026. Verfasst von Yongping Bao und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 32 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst Baden-Württemberg, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In infinitely or indefinitely repeated games with noisy signals about others’ actions, sustaining cooperation is difficult. Theoretical work shows that cooperation can be maintained if the signals are correlated and the degree of correlation depends on the actions. In this study, we implement such an information structure in a laboratory experiment and investigate whether subjects are able to sustain cooperation by conditioning their behavior on it. A substantial number of subjects adopt strategies accounting for the correlation, but this does not increase cooperation compared to a control treatment without correlation, as behavior with independent signals is more lenient when players can communicate, while without communication cooperation remains low in both settings.

Förderung

  • Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales
  • Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst Baden-Württemberg
  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

Zitieren

APA

Bao, Y., Dvorak, F., & Fehrler, S. (2026). Sustaining cooperation with correlated information: an experimental test. Experimental Economics, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2026.10069

Vancouver

Bao Y, Dvorak F, Fehrler S. Sustaining cooperation with correlated information: an experimental test. Experimental Economics. 2026:1-18. doi:10.1017/eec.2026.10069

BibTeX
@article{Bao2026,
  author = {Bao, Yongping and Dvorak, Fabian and Fehrler, Sebastian},
  title = {Sustaining cooperation with correlated information: an experimental test},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {1--18},
  doi = {10.1017/eec.2026.10069}
}
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