Rational conjectures and evolutionary beliefs in public goods games
Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2021-12 · 23 (6) · 1130-1143
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12503 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2021-02. Verfasst von Matthew McGinty. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 30 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper applies conjectural variations (CVs) to a model of public good provision and shows that CVs are superior to Nash beliefs. In addition to imposing consistency, as Bresnahan, I show that consistent conjectures (CCs) are obtained from individual payoff maximization. CCs emerge as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (NE) in a two‐stage game in which beliefs are chosen in Stage 1 and quantities in Stage 2. There is an individual payoff advantage to non‐Nash behavior, generating a Prisoner's Dilemma in conjectures in addition to the usual free‐rider problem associated with public goods. The correct and payoff maximizing conjecture is the unique equilibrium in an evolutionary framework against a player with Nash conjectures. The consistent conjecture equilibrium is the unique evolutionary equilibrium when both players conjectures evolve. Hence, the NE prediction is too optimistic when players have rational conjectures.
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APA
McGinty, M. (2021). Rational conjectures and evolutionary beliefs in public goods games. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 23(6), 1130-1143. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12503
Vancouver
McGinty M. Rational conjectures and evolutionary beliefs in public goods games. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2021;23(6):1130-1143. doi:10.1111/jpet.12503
BibTeX
@article{McGinty2021,
author = {McGinty, Matthew},
title = {Rational conjectures and evolutionary beliefs in public goods games},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
year = {2021},
volume = {23},
number = {6},
pages = {1130--1143},
doi = {10.1111/jpet.12503}
}
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