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Evolutionary dynamics of continuous public goods games in structured populations

Jing Luo iD, Duozi Lin, Xiaojie Chen iD, Attila Szolnoki iD

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · 01.04.2025 · 35 (4)

DOI: 10.1063/5.0262821 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, online erschienen am 08.04.2025. Verfasst von Jing Luo und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 66 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Sichuan Science and Technology Program, National Research, Development and Innovation Office.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Over the past few decades, many works have studied the evolutionary dynamics of continuous games. However, previous works have primarily focused on two-player games with pairwise interactions. Indeed, group interactions rather than pairwise interactions are usually found in real situations. The public goods game serves as a paradigm of multi-player interactions. Notably, various types of benefit functions are typically considered in public goods games, including linear, saturating, and sigmoid functions. Thus far, the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in continuous public goods games with these benefit functions remain unknown in structured populations. In this paper, we consider the continuous public goods game in structured populations. By employing the pair approximation approach, we derive the analytical expressions for invasion fitness. Furthermore, we explore the adaptive dynamics of cooperative investments in the game with various benefit functions. First, for the linear public goods game, we find that there is no singular strategy, and the cooperative investments evolve to either the maximum or minimum depending on the benefit-to-cost ratio. Subsequently, we examine the game with saturating benefit functions and demonstrate the potential existence of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Additionally, for the game with the sigmoid benefit function, we observe that the evolutionary outcomes are closely related to the threshold value. When the threshold is small, a unique ESS emerges. For intermediate threshold values, both the ESS and repellor singular strategies can coexist. When the threshold value is large, a unique repellor displays. Finally, we perform individual-based simulations to validate our theoretical results.

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China.
  • Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary.

ORCID-Profile: Jing Luo, Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Sichuan Science and Technology Program
  • National Research, Development and Innovation Office

Zitieren

APA

Luo, J., Lin, D., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2025). Evolutionary dynamics of continuous public goods games in structured populations. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 35(4). https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0262821

Vancouver

Luo J, Lin D, Chen X, Szolnoki A. Evolutionary dynamics of continuous public goods games in structured populations. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. 2025;35(4). doi:10.1063/5.0262821

BibTeX
@article{Luo2025,
  author = {Luo, Jing and Lin, Duozi and Chen, Xiaojie and Szolnoki, Attila},
  title = {Evolutionary dynamics of continuous public goods games in structured populations},
  journal = {Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {35},
  number = {4},
  doi = {10.1063/5.0262821}
}
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