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Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games

César Mantilla, Rajiv Sethi, Juan Camilo Cárdenas

Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2020-04 · 22 (2) · 355-370

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12351 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, online erschienen am 26.12.2018. Verfasst von César Mantilla und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 30-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Most models of social preferences and bounded rationality that are effective in explaining efficiency‐increasing departures from equilibrium behavior cannot easily account for similar deviations when they are efficiency‐reducing. We show that the notion of sampling equilibrium, subject to a suitable stability refinement, can account for behavior in both efficiency‐enhancing and efficiency‐reducing conditions. In particular, in public goods games with dominant strategy equilibria, stable sampling equilibrium can involve the play of dominated strategies with positive probability both when such behavior increases aggregate payoffs (relative to the standard prediction) and when it reduces aggregate payoffs. The dominant strategy equilibrium prediction changes abruptly from zero contribution to full contribution as a parameter crosses a threshold, whereas the stable sampling equilibrium remains fully mixed throughout. This is consistent with the available experimental evidence.

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APA

Mantilla, C., Sethi, R., & Cárdenas, J. C. (2020). Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 22(2), 355-370. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12351

Vancouver

Mantilla C, Sethi R, Cárdenas JC. Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2020;22(2):355-370. doi:10.1111/jpet.12351

BibTeX
@article{Mantilla2020,
  author = {Mantilla, César and Sethi, Rajiv and Cárdenas, Juan Camilo},
  title = {Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {22},
  number = {2},
  pages = {355--370},
  doi = {10.1111/jpet.12351}
}
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