Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 05.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/joie.70035 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 05.07.2026. Verfasst von Vincenzo Denicolò und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study how a blockholder who controls a firm should acquire a minority stake in a rival: directly, creating common ownership , or indirectly through the controlled firm, creating cross‐ownership . Common ownership generates stronger internalization of competitive externalities and allows the blockholder to capture the resulting gains without sharing them with dispersed shareholders. However, it may also create conflicts of interest with minority shareholders that can lead to a loss of control. Cross‐ownership avoids this governance risk but internalizes competition less effectively. We characterize how the optimal acquisition mode depends on the nature of product market competition and the strength of corporate governance.
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APA
Denicolò, V., & Panunzi, F. (2026). Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership. The Journal of Industrial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70035
Vancouver
Denicolò V, Panunzi F. Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2026. doi:10.1111/joie.70035
BibTeX
@article{Denicol2026,
author = {Denicolò, Vincenzo and Panunzi, Fausto},
title = {Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/joie.70035}
}
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