EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership

Vincenzo Denicolò, Fausto Panunzi

The Journal of Industrial Economics · 05.07.2026

DOI: 10.1111/joie.70035 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 05.07.2026. Verfasst von Vincenzo Denicolò und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study how a blockholder who controls a firm should acquire a minority stake in a rival: directly, creating common ownership , or indirectly through the controlled firm, creating cross‐ownership . Common ownership generates stronger internalization of competitive externalities and allows the blockholder to capture the resulting gains without sharing them with dispersed shareholders. However, it may also create conflicts of interest with minority shareholders that can lead to a loss of control. Cross‐ownership avoids this governance risk but internalizes competition less effectively. We characterize how the optimal acquisition mode depends on the nature of product market competition and the strength of corporate governance.

Zitieren

APA

Denicolò, V., & Panunzi, F. (2026). Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership. The Journal of Industrial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70035

Vancouver

Denicolò V, Panunzi F. Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2026. doi:10.1111/joie.70035

BibTeX
@article{Denicol2026,
  author = {Denicolò, Vincenzo and Panunzi, Fausto},
  title = {Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership},
  journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/joie.70035}
}
Kostenlos starten →