How Are Firms Sold? The Role of Common Ownership
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2025-11 · 60 (7) · 3380-3411
DOI: 10.1017/s0022109024000899 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, online erschienen am 13.05.2025. Verfasst von Mohammad (Vahid) Irani und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We find that common ownership among acquirers enhances rather than hinders competition in the firm sale process. One common owner raises the likelihood that target firms are sold through auction (vs. negotiation with one buyer) by 21.5%. The effect is causal according to identifications based on mergers between financial institutions. Exploring economic channels, we observe selling firms respond to common ownership among acquirers by avoiding cross-owned acquirers, bargaining hard, and inviting more buyers when cross-owned acquirers initiate the deal but not by terminating the deal. Consistent with enhanced competition, common ownership among acquirers is positively associated with deal quality.
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APA
Irani, M. V., Yang, W., & Zhang, F. (2025). How Are Firms Sold? The Role of Common Ownership. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 60(7), 3380-3411. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109024000899
Vancouver
Irani MV, Yang W, Zhang F. How Are Firms Sold? The Role of Common Ownership. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2025;60(7):3380-3411. doi:10.1017/s0022109024000899
BibTeX
@article{Irani2025,
author = {Irani, Mohammad (Vahid) and Yang, Wenhao and Zhang, Feng},
title = {How Are Firms Sold? The Role of Common Ownership},
journal = {Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
year = {2025},
volume = {60},
number = {7},
pages = {3380--3411},
doi = {10.1017/s0022109024000899}
}
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