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Delegation of Regulation*

Tapas Kundu, Tore Nilssen

The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2020-09 · 68 (3) · 445-482

DOI: 10.1111/joie.12238 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 12.11.2020. Verfasst von Tapas Kundu und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We discuss a government’s incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a trade‐off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that the government does not have, but at the same time, they have other preferences than the government. The preference bias and the private information interact to affect the incentives to delegate regulation. Allowing for constrained delegation, we introduce the concepts of weak and strict delegation. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces with bureaucratic drift, while the effect of increased uncertainty about the firm’s technology depends on how that uncertainty changes.

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APA

Kundu, T., & Nilssen, T. (2020). Delegation of Regulation*. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 68(3), 445-482. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12238

Vancouver

Kundu T, Nilssen T. Delegation of Regulation*. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2020;68(3):445-482. doi:10.1111/joie.12238

BibTeX
@article{Kundu2020,
  author = {Kundu, Tapas and Nilssen, Tore},
  title = {Delegation of Regulation*},
  journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {68},
  number = {3},
  pages = {445--482},
  doi = {10.1111/joie.12238}
}
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