Information Aggregation With Delegation of Votes
International Economic Review · 30.10.2026
DOI: 10.1111/iere.70126 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Economic Review, online erschienen am 30.10.2026. Verfasst von Amrita Dhillon und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 47 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Liquid democracy (LD) combines elements of direct and representative democracy: voters can either vote directly or delegate their votes to others. We study its information aggregation properties in a setting with heterogeneously and privately informed independent and partisan voters. We establish that LD always has equilibria that improve welfare and information aggregation relative to direct democracy, identify economically interpretable conditions under which these gains are strict, and characterise optimal delegation for salient classes of committees. However, while delegation improves the best‐equilibrium, it can also introduce robust inefficient equilibria that perform worse than direct democracy.
Förderung
- Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Dhillon, A., Kotsialou, G., Ravindran, D., & Xefteris, D. (2026). Information Aggregation With Delegation of Votes. International Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70126
Vancouver
Dhillon A, Kotsialou G, Ravindran D, Xefteris D. Information Aggregation With Delegation of Votes. International Economic Review. 2026. doi:10.1111/iere.70126
BibTeX
@article{Dhillon2026,
author = {Dhillon, Amrita and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Ravindran, Dilip and Xefteris, Dimitrios},
title = {Information Aggregation With Delegation of Votes},
journal = {International Economic Review},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/iere.70126}
}
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