Trading and Shareholder Democracy
The Journal of Finance · 2024-02 · 79 (1) · 257-304
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13289 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 21.11.2023. Verfasst von DORON LEVIT und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 79-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 94 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self‐fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy for the latter. Relaxing trading frictions can reduce welfare because it allows extreme shareholders to gain more weight in voting. Delegating decision‐making to the board can help overcome collective action problems at the voting stage. We also analyze the role of index investors and social concerns of shareholders.
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APA
LEVIT, D., MALENKO, N., & MAUG, E. (2024). Trading and Shareholder Democracy. The Journal of Finance, 79(1), 257-304. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13289
Vancouver
LEVIT D, MALENKO N, MAUG E. Trading and Shareholder Democracy. The Journal of Finance. 2024;79(1):257-304. doi:10.1111/jofi.13289
BibTeX
@article{LEVIT2024,
author = {LEVIT, DORON and MALENKO, NADYA and MAUG, ERNST},
title = {Trading and Shareholder Democracy},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {79},
number = {1},
pages = {257--304},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13289}
}
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