ES Risks and Shareholder Voice
The Review of Financial Studies · 20.11.2023 · 36 (12) · 4824-4863
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad033 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Review of Financial Studies, online erschienen am 26.05.2023. Verfasst von Yazhou Ellen He und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 122-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine whether shareholder votes in environmental and social (ES) proposals are informative about firms’ ES risks. ES proposals are unique in that they nearly always fail. We examine whether mutual funds’ support for these failed proposals contains information about the ES risks that firms face. Higher support in failed ES proposals predicts subsequent ES incidents and the effects of these incidents on shareholder value. Examining the detailed records of fund votes, we find that agency frictions between a group of shareholders contribute to proposal failure. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online
Zitieren
APA
He, Y. E., Kahraman, B., & Lowry, M. (2023). ES Risks and Shareholder Voice. The Review of Financial Studies, 36(12), 4824-4863. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad033
Vancouver
He YE, Kahraman B, Lowry M. ES Risks and Shareholder Voice. The Review of Financial Studies. 2023;36(12):4824-4863. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhad033
BibTeX
@article{He2023,
author = {He, Yazhou Ellen and Kahraman, Bige and Lowry, Michelle},
title = {ES Risks and Shareholder Voice},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
year = {2023},
volume = {36},
number = {12},
pages = {4824--4863},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhad033}
}
EUVIMED