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Insider Trading as a Compensation Mechanism

Jiawei Chen, Caleb M. Houston, Benjamin Jansen

Journal of Financial Research · 2026-09 · 49 (3) · 938-976

DOI: 10.1111/jfir.70024 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Financial Research, online erschienen am 26.09.2025. Verfasst von Jiawei Chen und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 78 Literaturangaben.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

We find evidence that insiders at resource constrained firms trade more often and in patterns indicating the use of private information. Our findings are driven by insider sales relative to cash‐based compensation. This indicates that when compensation is not directly tied to firm value, insiders are more likely to trade opportunistically, even if their trade transmits a negative market signal. Insiders also realize significant abnormal returns following transactions at resource constrained firms, indicating that insiders are trading with private information and consistently profiting. Overall, these results suggest that insiders at resource constrained firms utilize insider trading to supplement their compensation.

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APA

Chen, J., Houston, C. M., & Jansen, B. (2026). Insider Trading as a Compensation Mechanism. Journal of Financial Research, 49(3), 938-976. https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.70024

Vancouver

Chen J, Houston CM, Jansen B. Insider Trading as a Compensation Mechanism. Journal of Financial Research. 2026;49(3):938-976. doi:10.1111/jfir.70024

BibTeX
@article{Chen2026,
  author = {Chen, Jiawei and Houston, Caleb M. and Jansen, Benjamin},
  title = {Insider Trading as a Compensation Mechanism},
  journal = {Journal of Financial Research},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {49},
  number = {3},
  pages = {938--976},
  doi = {10.1111/jfir.70024}
}
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