Crime, Punishment, and Expectations
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies · 2026-06 · 23 (2) · 270-286
DOI: 10.1111/jels.70032 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, online erschienen am 06.05.2026. Verfasst von Mohammad H. Rahmati und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 52 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Crime doesn't pay. Or does it? We study the role of expectations regarding sanctions and the likelihood of detection on whether people obey the law. We examine how expectations influence whether people obey the law and conduct simulations of various enforcement counterfactuals. We find the average assessment of the likelihood of detection is reasonably accurate, but those who (mistakenly) believe the probability is lower than it is are much more likely to break the law. Further, expectations with regard to the likely consequences of getting caught are also heterogeneous. In our simulations, perceived fines have little impact on willingness to break the law, but a higher perceived likelihood of apprehension has an appreciable impact. Because marginal respondents are pivotal in the rate of law‐breaking, debiasing expectations among the whole population has little impact.
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APA
Rahmati, M. H., & Hyman, D. A. (2026). Crime, Punishment, and Expectations. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 23(2), 270-286. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.70032
Vancouver
Rahmati MH, Hyman DA. Crime, Punishment, and Expectations. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. 2026;23(2):270-286. doi:10.1111/jels.70032
BibTeX
@article{Rahmati2026,
author = {Rahmati, Mohammad H. and Hyman, David A.},
title = {Crime, Punishment, and Expectations},
journal = {Journal of Empirical Legal Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {23},
number = {2},
pages = {270--286},
doi = {10.1111/jels.70032}
}
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