Socially Optimal Crime and Punishment
Journal of the European Economic Association · 05.06.2026
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvag025 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the European Economic Association, online erschienen am 05.06.2026. Verfasst von Eduardo Ferraz und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: University of Lille.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model of crime with heterogeneous agents and human capital accumulation. Agents decide whether to commit crimes by comparing potential gains with the expected punishment. Public security policies are defined as pairs of a size of the police force and an average sentence length. We propose a micro-founded public security technology linking expenditures on police to the probability of apprehension of a criminal. We illustrate the relevance of this theoretical framework by using an estimated version of the model using US data to (i) characterize the socially optimal public security policy; (ii) explore potential complementarities across public security and educational policies; and (iii) show that comparative statics exercises often lead, under reasonable parameter values, to recommendations that differ from those obtained in a global optimality analysis. These results highlight the relevance of equilibrium considerations in the economic analysis of crime. The paper gives a methodological first step towards building a manageable model of crime that can bring together different pieces of evidence—and equilibrium considerations—when evaluating the trade-offs across policy alternatives.
Förderung
- University of Lille
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APA
Ferraz, E., & Soares, R. R. (2026). Socially Optimal Crime and Punishment. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvag025
Vancouver
Ferraz E, Soares RR. Socially Optimal Crime and Punishment. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2026. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvag025
BibTeX
@article{Ferraz2026,
author = {Ferraz, Eduardo and Soares, Rodrigo R},
title = {Socially Optimal Crime and Punishment},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvag025}
}
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