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The EU Energy Crisis and a New Geopolitics of Climate Transition

Andreas C. Goldthau, Richard Youngs

JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies · 2023-09 · 61 (S1) · 115-124

DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13539 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, published online on 2023-08-29. Written by Andreas C. Goldthau and 1 co-authors. Cited 67 times so far (Crossref); 49 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

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Abstract (original language)

In 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine had a profound effect on EU energy and climate policies. The EU redesigned its approach to the geopolitics of energy security as it sought alternatives to Russian supplies with accelerated urgency. It upgraded its commitments to energy transition internally and through external actions too, whilst member states balanced these with the domestic politics of a cost-of-living crisis triggered by the war. The new era of geopolitical power had repercussions for the conceptual contours of EU approaches to energy and climate security, which were elevated to hard security issues. The article reviews the key developments in EU energy and climate policies in 2022 and notes three emerging and inter-related conceptual shifts in these: the securitization of the green transition, a more realpolitik approach to external climate actions and a rebalancing towards state intervention. The energy crisis that shook European politics in 2022 started before Russia's war against Ukraine. A function of post-Covid recovery, European, North American and Asian economies had begun to revive in 2021, which brought back industrial demand for process heat and electricity. Strong economic recovery in Asia drove up liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices and meant that lower quantities were available for other consumers (IEA, 2022). Moreover, EU carbon prices picked up, which incentivized a fuel switch from coal to gas (Reuters, 2021). Other factors, such as a hot summer, brought about marginal additional demand. On the supply side, outages at LNG export facilities left global LNG markets strained even further. Russia had higher-than-usual domestic demand (TASS, 2021), whilst also deliberately going slow on filling up storage capacity in Europe over the summer (IEA, 2022). By the beginning of the heating season 2021, filling levels in European gas storage stood at 74.6%, 20% lower than the preceding year, and Gazprom-run storages were at a mere 22% (European Commission, 2022d). This brought Europe into direct competition with Asian consumer markets for alternative LNG supplies. Energy markets were tight as Europe went into 2022. Russia's invasion and the ensuing gradual reduction of gas exports to Europe dramatically aggravated this situation. From July to September 2022, Russian pipeline gas exports to Europe reduced by some 74% compared with 2021. Yamal Europe, the pipeline through Belarus and landing in Poland, was down almost entirely, whilst transit through the Ukrainian pipeline system landing in Slovakia and Romania was reduced by 63% (European Commission, 2023e). Russian gas supply to Europe through Nord Stream came to a halt at the end of September 2022 as the pipeline through the Baltic Sea was sabotaged. By the end of 2022, gas exports had dwindled to marginal volumes. After many years of sending around 150 billion cubic metres to European consumer markets every year or a third of overall EU consumption, Russia ended its role as a prime supplier. Against the backdrop of a strained market situation, this amounted to a perfect storm. Gas prices at the TTF, the European benchmark for LNG, saw all-time highs of 319.98 EUR/MWh in August 2022 – some 15 times the pre-war levels. Because the European power market is indirectly tied to gas – thanks to gas setting the price as the marginal fuel, the so-called merit order principle – electricity markets were in upheaval as well. As per estimates of the European Commission, power benchmark prices in the third quarter of 2022 averaged 339 EUR/MWh, an increase of 222% compared with 2021 (European Commission, 2023d). An already high Eurozone inflation picked up even further, reaching 10% by the end of 2022 (Eurostat, 2023). Clearly, skyrocketing TTF prices ensured LNG cargos found their way into Europe and drove imports of LNG to record levels. Yet, the macroeconomic impact was significant as energy-intensive sectors such as chemicals, paper and steel decreased production, making longer term European industrial competitiveness a key policy concern (Bloomberg, 2022; Reuters, 2022c). What is more, high energy prices became a social issue as they affected vulnerable households the most. European policy responses centred around replacing natural gas with alternative fuels and decarbonizing the European energy and production system. This, on the one hand, meant bringing back fossil fuels, notably coal. Though demand increments remained smaller than feared, power sector CO2 emissions alone went up by almost 4% in 2022 (Ember, 2023). It also meant enhancing the supply of renewable energy and increasing production capacity. In May 2022, the Commission presented a comprehensive policy package dubbed REPowerEU, aimed at phasing out Russian fossil fuels in Europe's imports ‘well before 2030’ and at speeding up the clean energy transition. The REPowerEU plan rested on enhancing clean energy sources by raising renewables targets, eventually agreed to be 42.5% by 2030, accelerating the permitting processes for major renewable projects and building up a (green) hydrogen economy. Aimed at helping the decarbonization of industry, the EU prepared a Green Deal Industrial Plan that member states eventually signed off in early 2023. This aimed to support a faster transition to climate neutrality, inter alia through a Net Zero Industry Act (European Commission, 2023a, 2023c) supporting the build-up of clean tech production within Europe. The Plan envisaged the loosening of state aid to support industrial transformation by at the same time encouraging national governments to consider tax breaks in support of green net-zero technologies investments. A ban of fossil-fuel-based combustion engines by 2035 agreed in late 2022 (Reuters, 2023a), coupled with efforts to revise the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (Council of the EU, 2022) sought structurally to alter demand patterns in mobility and heating. On the national level, governments also rushed to enhance clean energy targets. For example, the Netherlands announced plans to double capacity in offshore wind by 2030 (Reuters, 2022b). Germany upped its goal for renewables in the power mix to 80% by 2030 (Cleanergywire, 2022), whilst Italy entered the offshore wind business with determination, aiming to install 5.5 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2030 (WindPower Monthly, 2022). Greece introduced the country's first Offshore Wind Law and set a target of 2 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2030 (IEA, 2023). Portugal raised targets for renewable energy in its power mix by 20%, now aiming for 80% by 2026 (Reuters, 2022). In a 2022 energy security strategy, the United Kingdom promised ‘self-sufficient’ energy supply as a way of decarbonizing the electricity system by 2035 (HM Department for Business, 2022). Even coal-heavy Poland made determined efforts to increase the share of renewables in the mix, with 2022 marking a year of significant growth of the industry (Reuters, 2023b). Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, the United Kingdom and Sweden agreed on developing 300 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2050, thus effectively making the North Sea a ‘green power plant’ (De Croo et al., 2023). The European Union collectively and national governments individually mobilized significant funds in reaction to the energy crisis. Much of this funding was meant to buffer high energy costs. By October 2022, energy subsidies earmarked or spent in support of industry and households had surpassed EUR 700 billion (Goldthau and Tagliapietra, 2022). Spending was uneven across Europe and reflected European governments' differing abilities to spend their way out of the crisis. The European Commission allowed green state aid to the tune of EUR 51 billion during the year (European Commission, 2023a). Germany announced plans to invest more than EUR 200 billion into industrial decarbonization (Reuters, 2022a), whereas other large economies such as France pledged additional spending on decarbonizing its economy, on top of EUR 30 billion of green recovery money announced earlier (Euractiv, 2022a). Portugal announced more than EUR 25 billion of public and private finance over 10 years (Reuters, 2022). On the European level, REPowerEU is to add EUR 210 billion in investment for, mainly, renewables, hydrogen and energy efficiency (S&P Global, 2022). Taken together, these measures are argued to having brought forward the EU energy transition by a decade (The Economist, 2023). In parallel to these profound adjustments to domestic energy policies, European governments also introduced a battery of new external commitments in 2022. In reaction to a ‘return of geopolitical energy security’ (Kuzemko et al., 2022), European policy-makers were quick to put in place policy measures aimed at ensuring supplies, lowering demand and keeping prices in check. The EU and member states signed dozens of new energy accords to increase oil and gas imports in 2022. A flurry of energy diplomatic efforts aimed to contract additional gas from producer countries, including Norway, Qatar and the United States. The EU signed a deal with Azerbaijan to double gas supplies, whilst talks about East Mediterranean gas involved a new accord with Egypt and Israel. Several governments negotiated their own supply agreements with countries like Algeria, Angola and Libya (ECFR, 2022a). The EU invested significant time during the year in introducing a cap on the price of gas imports, a measure that would previously have been anathema to the logic of external energy policy. It also moved forward with a common purchasing vehicle, the EU Energy Platform, to help drive down the price of imported gas; this measure had been discussed on and off over many years but without gaining momentum and yet now advanced, to start operation in 2023 (European Commission, 2023a, 2023b). Significantly, most of the new gas deals included clean energy commitments. The EU was able to argue that notwith

Cite

APA

Goldthau, A. C., & Youngs, R. (2023). The EU Energy Crisis and a New Geopolitics of Climate Transition. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 61(S1), 115-124. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13539

Vancouver

Goldthau AC, Youngs R. The EU Energy Crisis and a New Geopolitics of Climate Transition. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 2023;61(S1):115-124. doi:10.1111/jcms.13539

BibTeX
@article{Goldthau2023,
  author = {Goldthau, Andreas C. and Youngs, Richard},
  title = {The EU Energy Crisis and a New Geopolitics of Climate Transition},
  journal = {JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {61},
  number = {S1},
  pages = {115--124},
  doi = {10.1111/jcms.13539}
}
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