Managerial Overoptimism and Discretionary Disclosure
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · 2026-08 · 53 (4) · 1337-1356
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.70059 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, published online on 2026-03-02. Written by Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen and 1 co-authors. 62 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Funded by: Danmarks Frie Forskningsfond.
Abstract (original language)
We examine the effect of managerial overoptimism on discretionary disclosure of subjective information, such as earnings forecasts. The market applies a discount upon disclosure to capture the possibility that the revealed subjective expectation is too optimistic. While this discount is correct on average, it is too high (low) for a truly objective (overoptimistic) manager. Consequently, overoptimistic managers disclose more frequently, and their firms are overvalued. We show that higher levels of overoptimism or a greater fraction of overoptimistic managers amplify the market discount, which ultimately reduces overall disclosure in equilibrium.
Funding
- Danmarks Frie Forskningsfond
Cite
APA
Lambertsen, N. N., & Lassak, M. (2026). Managerial Overoptimism and Discretionary Disclosure. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 53(4), 1337-1356. https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.70059
Vancouver
Lambertsen NN, Lassak M. Managerial Overoptimism and Discretionary Disclosure. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 2026;53(4):1337-1356. doi:10.1111/jbfa.70059
BibTeX
@article{Lambertsen2026,
author = {Lambertsen, Nikolaj Niebuhr and Lassak, Matthias},
title = {Managerial Overoptimism and Discretionary Disclosure},
journal = {Journal of Business Finance & Accounting},
year = {2026},
volume = {53},
number = {4},
pages = {1337--1356},
doi = {10.1111/jbfa.70059}
}
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