Does union bargaining power always raise union wages?
International Journal of Economic Theory · 2026-09 · 22 (3) · 337-350
DOI: 10.1111/ijet.70023 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Economic Theory, online erschienen am 29.04.2026. Verfasst von Hiroyuki Nishiyama und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 19 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Despite falling unionization rates, the union wage premium remains a robust empirical regularity. To shed light on this contrasting wage impact of unions, we develop a union wage model with firm heterogeneity and a social insurance system. In the absence of a fiscal sector, greater bargaining power raises union wages and lowers nonunion wages. In contrast, when unemployment benefits adjust endogenously to balance the government budget, greater bargaining power instead lowers union wages and raises nonunion wages. Our results suggest that understanding the wage impact of unions depends critically on the interaction between firm heterogeneity and the social insurance system.
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APA
Nishiyama, H., Nakano, M., & Tsuboi, M. (2026). Does union bargaining power always raise union wages?. International Journal of Economic Theory, 22(3), 337-350. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70023
Vancouver
Nishiyama H, Nakano M, Tsuboi M. Does union bargaining power always raise union wages?. International Journal of Economic Theory. 2026;22(3):337-350. doi:10.1111/ijet.70023
BibTeX
@article{Nishiyama2026,
author = {Nishiyama, Hiroyuki and Nakano, Mina and Tsuboi, Mizuki},
title = {Does union bargaining power always raise union wages?},
journal = {International Journal of Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {22},
number = {3},
pages = {337--350},
doi = {10.1111/ijet.70023}
}
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