Union Bargaining Power and the Amenity-Wage Trade-Off
American Economic Review · 01.11.2026 · 116 (11) · 4116-4157
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240766 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.11.2026. Verfasst von Lorenzo Lagos. Die Arbeit nennt 79 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies how collective bargaining affects wages and amenities. By merging collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) to linked employer-employee data in Brazil, I combine rich contracted amenities with wage information. I implement a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits a court ruling enforcing CBA continuation (i.e., ultra-activity) to estimate the effects of union bargaining power. Strengthening unions raises wages and amenities without reducing employment—increasing retention despite some labor-labor substitution. A revealed-preference approach shows that amenities account for 45 percent of total compensation gains. These findings suggest that collective bargaining can offset monopsony power, but employers retain the right-to-manage workforce composition. (JEL J31, J32, J42, J51, J52, O15)
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APA
Lagos, L. (2026). Union Bargaining Power and the Amenity-Wage Trade-Off. American Economic Review, 116(11), 4116-4157. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20240766
Vancouver
Lagos L. Union Bargaining Power and the Amenity-Wage Trade-Off. American Economic Review. 2026;116(11):4116-4157. doi:10.1257/aer.20240766
BibTeX
@article{Lagos2026,
author = {Lagos, Lorenzo},
title = {Union Bargaining Power and the Amenity-Wage Trade-Off},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {116},
number = {11},
pages = {4116--4157},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20240766}
}
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