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Union Bargaining Power and the Amenity-Wage Trade-Off

Lorenzo Lagos

American Economic Review · 01.11.2026 · 116 (11) · 4116-4157

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240766 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.11.2026. Verfasst von Lorenzo Lagos. Die Arbeit nennt 79 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper studies how collective bargaining affects wages and amenities. By merging collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) to linked employer-employee data in Brazil, I combine rich contracted amenities with wage information. I implement a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits a court ruling enforcing CBA continuation (i.e., ultra-activity) to estimate the effects of union bargaining power. Strengthening unions raises wages and amenities without reducing employment—increasing retention despite some labor-labor substitution. A revealed-preference approach shows that amenities account for 45 percent of total compensation gains. These findings suggest that collective bargaining can offset monopsony power, but employers retain the right-to-manage workforce composition. (JEL J31, J32, J42, J51, J52, O15)

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APA

Lagos, L. (2026). Union Bargaining Power and the Amenity-Wage Trade-Off. American Economic Review, 116(11), 4116-4157. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20240766

Vancouver

Lagos L. Union Bargaining Power and the Amenity-Wage Trade-Off. American Economic Review. 2026;116(11):4116-4157. doi:10.1257/aer.20240766

BibTeX
@article{Lagos2026,
  author = {Lagos, Lorenzo},
  title = {Union Bargaining Power and the Amenity-Wage Trade-Off},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {116},
  number = {11},
  pages = {4116--4157},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20240766}
}
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