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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Stock Option Incentives and Corporate Hedging Decisions: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Chengcheng Charlie Huang, Yisong S. Tian

Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments · 2026-02 · 35 (1-2) · 3-31

DOI: 10.1111/fmii.70006 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, online erschienen am 09.05.2026. Verfasst von Chengcheng Charlie Huang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 34 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper examines how managerial risk‐taking incentives impact corporate hedging decisions. By nesting a well‐known corporate hedging model within a principal‐agent framework, we show that managers are motivated to maintain the same level of hedge intensity even if they are provided with stock option incentives. They are, however, motivated to add speculative positions on the downside to supplement their hedging operations. These predictions are verified empirically using separate measures for hedging and speculative activities. Our results contradict previous studies that suggest that managers hedge less of their firm's risk if they have stock option incentives.

Förderung

  • Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

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APA

Huang, C. C., & Tian, Y. S. (2026). Stock Option Incentives and Corporate Hedging Decisions: Theory and Empirical Evidence. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 35(1-2), 3-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.70006

Vancouver

Huang CC, Tian YS. Stock Option Incentives and Corporate Hedging Decisions: Theory and Empirical Evidence. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments. 2026;35(1-2):3-31. doi:10.1111/fmii.70006

BibTeX
@article{Huang2026,
  author = {Huang, Chengcheng Charlie and Tian, Yisong S.},
  title = {Stock Option Incentives and Corporate Hedging Decisions: Theory and Empirical Evidence},
  journal = {Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {35},
  number = {1-2},
  pages = {3--31},
  doi = {10.1111/fmii.70006}
}
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