CEO Restricted Stock, Incentives, and Corporate Innovations*
Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies · 2024-08 · 53 (4) · 504-525
DOI: 10.1111/ajfs.12486 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 2024-07. Verfasst von Yi Boli und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 28 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the relation between CEO restricted stock, CEO incentives, and firm innovation. We first show that restricted stock is negatively associated with R&D investment. We also show that CEO restricted stock is positively related to the number of patents granted and citations received. However, further investigation shows that CEO restricted stock has a positive relation with firm exploitation but a negative relation with firm exploration and breakthrough innovation. The results suggest that restricted stock appears to incentivize CEOs to make efficient R&D investments and produce more innovative outputs in general, but only through exploitation rather than exploration and breakthrough innovations.
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APA
Boli, Y., & Oh, J. (2024). CEO Restricted Stock, Incentives, and Corporate Innovations*. Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 53(4), 504-525. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajfs.12486
Vancouver
Boli Y, Oh J. CEO Restricted Stock, Incentives, and Corporate Innovations*. Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies. 2024;53(4):504-525. doi:10.1111/ajfs.12486
BibTeX
@article{Boli2024,
author = {Boli, Yi and Oh, Jong‐Min},
title = {CEO Restricted Stock, Incentives, and Corporate Innovations*},
journal = {Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies},
year = {2024},
volume = {53},
number = {4},
pages = {504--525},
doi = {10.1111/ajfs.12486}
}
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