It is a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate‐Federal Contracting
Financial Review · 2019-02 · 54 (1) · 57-84
DOI: 10.1111/fire.12181 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Financial Review, published online on 2019-01-06. Written by Stephen P. Ferris and 2 co-authors. Cited 52 times so far (Crossref); 23 references.
Abstract (original language)
We examine whether political connections measured by political contributions influence the choice of terms included in government contracts awarded to firms. We construct an index of four “sweetheart” contract terms and find that firms making larger political contributions more frequently have these favorable terms included in their contracts. We also find that political contributions have explanatory power for contract design after controlling for lobbying, negotiation power, and the employment of former government employees. These results are robust to alternative model specifications, different estimation techniques, various variable measurements, and adjustments for possible endogeneity.
Cite
APA
Ferris, S. P., Houston, R., & Javakhadze, D. (2019). It is a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate‐Federal Contracting. Financial Review, 54(1), 57-84. https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12181
Vancouver
Ferris SP, Houston R, Javakhadze D. It is a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate‐Federal Contracting. Financial Review. 2019;54(1):57-84. doi:10.1111/fire.12181
BibTeX
@article{Ferris2019,
author = {Ferris, Stephen P. and Houston, Reza and Javakhadze, David},
title = {It is a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate‐Federal Contracting},
journal = {Financial Review},
year = {2019},
volume = {54},
number = {1},
pages = {57--84},
doi = {10.1111/fire.12181}
}
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