Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP
Financial Management · 2021-09 · 50 (3) · 619-644
DOI: 10.1111/fima.12292 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Financial Management, published online on 2020-09-02. Written by Ozlem Akin and 3 co-authors. Cited 14 times so far (Crossref); 74 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In politically connected banks, insider buying during the pre‐TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank‐specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance‐related government connections. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.
Cite
APA
Akin, O., Coleman, N. S., Fons‐Rosen, C., & Peydró, J. (2021). Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP. Financial Management, 50(3), 619-644. https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12292
Vancouver
Akin O, Coleman NS, Fons‐Rosen C, Peydró J. Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP. Financial Management. 2021;50(3):619-644. doi:10.1111/fima.12292
BibTeX
@article{Akin2021,
author = {Akin, Ozlem and Coleman, Nicholas S. and Fons‐Rosen, Christian and Peydró, José‐Luis},
title = {Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP},
journal = {Financial Management},
year = {2021},
volume = {50},
number = {3},
pages = {619--644},
doi = {10.1111/fima.12292}
}
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