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Crossref

Managerial risk aversion and the structure of executive compensation

Karel Hrazdil, Jeong Bon Kim, Jiri Novak, Christopher Zatzick

Corporate Governance: An International Review · 2023-07 · 31 (4) · 563-581

DOI: 10.1111/corg.12480 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Corporate Governance: An International Review, online erschienen am 24.07.2022. Verfasst von Karel Hrazdil und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 15-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 98 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Grantová Agentura České Republiky, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Research question/issue We examine how chief executive officers' (CEOs) innate risk aversion influences the size and structure of their compensation contracts. In so doing, we estimate managerial risk aversion based on the Big Five personality traits—openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism—inferred using IBM's Personality Insights service. Research findings/insights We provide evidence that executives' inherent risk aversion is related to their compensation structure. Contrary to agency theory predictions, we find that more risk‐averse CEOs receive more cash‐based and less equity‐based compensation but receive lower total compensation. This relationship is moderated by differences in firms' resource advantages. Theoretical/academic implications Despite the theoretical prediction that managerial risk aversion is a key factor determining the structure of executives' compensation contracts, there is limited empirical evidence on whether firms adjust the components of compensation based on CEOs' risk preferences. Our results help us better understand the interplay between CEO personality and executive compensation. Practitioner/policy implications This study offers important implications for organizations in that knowledge about executives' inherent risk aversion is important and relevant for designing effective compensation contracts.

Förderung

  • Grantová Agentura České Republiky
  • Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

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APA

Hrazdil, K., Kim, J. B., Novak, J., & Zatzick, C. (2023). Managerial risk aversion and the structure of executive compensation. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 31(4), 563-581. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12480

Vancouver

Hrazdil K, Kim JB, Novak J, Zatzick C. Managerial risk aversion and the structure of executive compensation. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2023;31(4):563-581. doi:10.1111/corg.12480

BibTeX
@article{Hrazdil2023,
  author = {Hrazdil, Karel and Kim, Jeong Bon and Novak, Jiri and Zatzick, Christopher},
  title = {Managerial risk aversion and the structure of executive compensation},
  journal = {Corporate Governance: An International Review},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {31},
  number = {4},
  pages = {563--581},
  doi = {10.1111/corg.12480}
}
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