Commitment problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine
Conflict Management and Peace Science · 2024-09 · 41 (5) · 494-513
DOI: 10.1177/07388942241248027 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Conflict Management and Peace Science, online erschienen am 26.04.2024. Verfasst von Bradley C. Smith. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper applies the logic of commitment problems to deliver insights about the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the canonical crisis bargaining framework, an anticipated power shift can cause bargaining failure. Bargaining breaks down in this context because a declining state reasons that fighting in the present from a strong position is preferable to negotiating in the future from a weaker position. I argue that this logic is relevant for understanding both Ukrainian and Russian decisionmaking in the lead-up to the invasion. The commitment problem logic also provides insight into the role of NATO in the conflict, highlighting flaws in existing arguments that the Russian invasion was “provoked” by NATO.
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APA
Smith, B. C. (2024). Commitment problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 41(5), 494-513. https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942241248027
Vancouver
Smith BC. Commitment problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 2024;41(5):494-513. doi:10.1177/07388942241248027
BibTeX
@article{Smith2024,
author = {Smith, Bradley C.},
title = {Commitment problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine},
journal = {Conflict Management and Peace Science},
year = {2024},
volume = {41},
number = {5},
pages = {494--513},
doi = {10.1177/07388942241248027}
}
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