ESG disclosure, CEO power and incentives and corporate risk‐taking
European Financial Management · 2024-03 · 30 (2) · 961-1011
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12447 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Financial Management, online erschienen am 28.07.2023. Verfasst von Faek Menla Ali und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 88-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 98 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper investigates the impact of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure on corporate risk‐taking and how this impact is further affected by chief executive officer (CEO) power and incentives within US companies. We find that ESG disclosure decreases corporate risk‐taking based on both accounting‐based and market‐based returns. Further, we find that ESG disclosure is more effective in mitigating market‐based risk‐taking than accounting‐based risk‐taking in a firm with a powerful CEO. In contrast, CEO's ESG‐incentivized engagement bonuses weaken ESG disclosure impacts in reducing both types of risk‐taking. Our analysis helps understanding of different trade‐offs of ESG disclosure in aligning all stakeholders' benefits under different managerial‐related factors.
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APA
Ali, F. M., Wu, Y., & Zhang, X. (2024). ESG disclosure, CEO power and incentives and corporate risk‐taking. European Financial Management, 30(2), 961-1011. https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12447
Vancouver
Ali FM, Wu Y, Zhang X. ESG disclosure, CEO power and incentives and corporate risk‐taking. European Financial Management. 2024;30(2):961-1011. doi:10.1111/eufm.12447
BibTeX
@article{Ali2024,
author = {Ali, Faek Menla and Wu, Yuanyuan and Zhang, Xiaoxiang},
title = {ESG disclosure, CEO power and incentives and corporate risk‐taking},
journal = {European Financial Management},
year = {2024},
volume = {30},
number = {2},
pages = {961--1011},
doi = {10.1111/eufm.12447}
}
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