Non‐controlling shareholder activism and executive pay‐for‐performance sensitivity: Evidence from the over‐appointment of directors in the Chinese market
Accounting & Finance · 2024-12 · 64 (5) · 4475-4514
DOI: 10.1111/acfi.13270 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Accounting & Finance, online erschienen am 21.05.2024. Verfasst von Shengnan Li und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 61 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Social Science Fund of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine the impact of non‐controlling shareholder activism on the effectiveness of executive compensation contract, particularly focusing on the over‐appointment of directors in A‐share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2021. We discover that such over‐appointments by non‐controlling shareholders significantly promote executive pay‐for‐performance sensitivity of these enterprises. This effect becomes even more pronounced in enterprises that display a weaker government intervention and media attention. Further mechanism analysis indicates that over‐appointments improve the effectiveness of compensation contract by improving the quality of accounting information and restraining executives' opportunistic behaviour. Our further research finds that over‐appointments by non‐controlling shareholders can effectively reduce executive compensation stickiness, while significantly increasing the absolute salary level of executives. There is no evidence to suggest that independent directors increase executive pay‐for‐performance sensitivity.
Förderung
- National Social Science Fund of China
Zitieren
APA
Li, S., Wang, J., Zheng, X., & Zhu, C. (2024). Non‐controlling shareholder activism and executive pay‐for‐performance sensitivity: Evidence from the over‐appointment of directors in the Chinese market. Accounting & Finance, 64(5), 4475-4514. https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.13270
Vancouver
Li S, Wang J, Zheng X, Zhu C. Non‐controlling shareholder activism and executive pay‐for‐performance sensitivity: Evidence from the over‐appointment of directors in the Chinese market. Accounting & Finance. 2024;64(5):4475-4514. doi:10.1111/acfi.13270
BibTeX
@article{Li2024,
author = {Li, Shengnan and Wang, Jiaqi and Zheng, Xinya and Zhu, Chiyun},
title = {Non‐controlling shareholder activism and executive pay‐for‐performance sensitivity: Evidence from the over‐appointment of directors in the Chinese market},
journal = {Accounting & Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {64},
number = {5},
pages = {4475--4514},
doi = {10.1111/acfi.13270}
}
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