Non‐executive directors and corporate risk‐taking: Evidence from China
Accounting & Finance · 2024-12 · 64 (S1) · 5069-5106
DOI: 10.1111/acfi.13326 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Accounting & Finance, online erschienen am 15.08.2024. Verfasst von Siyu Zhang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 73 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study empirically examines the relationship between non‐executive directors and corporate risk‐taking. The findings show that non‐executive directors could significantly improve the risk‐taking level of corporations. Non‐executive directors reduce corporate agency costs and alleviate financing constraints, thus promoting a corporation's risk‐taking level. Further research shows that the positive impact of non‐executive directors on corporate risk‐taking is weakened by being state‐owned, higher executive incentives, better external supervision, higher ownership concentration, higher management age and greater uncertainty in the external environment. Additionally, non‐executive directors appointed by both controlling and non‐controlling shareholders play a positive role in promoting corporate risk‐taking.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Zhang, S., & Lu, C. (2024). Non‐executive directors and corporate risk‐taking: Evidence from China. Accounting & Finance, 64(S1), 5069-5106. https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.13326
Vancouver
Zhang S, Lu C. Non‐executive directors and corporate risk‐taking: Evidence from China. Accounting & Finance. 2024;64(S1):5069-5106. doi:10.1111/acfi.13326
BibTeX
@article{Zhang2024,
author = {Zhang, Siyu and Lu, Chao},
title = {Non‐executive directors and corporate risk‐taking: Evidence from China},
journal = {Accounting & Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {64},
number = {S1},
pages = {5069--5106},
doi = {10.1111/acfi.13326}
}
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