US ‐China Rivalry and the Global Governance Trilemma: Three Scenarios for World Order

Vollständiger Abstract

Worum geht es in dieser Arbeit?

ABSTRACT We examine the consequences of US‐China rivalry for future world order in light of the global governance trilemma. The trilemma captures persistent trade‐offs between three dimensions of global governance: authority, breadth, and universality. The contemporary US‐China rivalry exacerbates the global governance trilemma, making these trade‐offs increasingly acute. Drawing on hegemonic order theories, we argue that the trilemma was attenuated in the post‐Cold War period owing to a hegemonic alignment of power and purpose that enabled the emergence of a relatively universal, broad, and authoritative system of global governance. By putting an end to this hegemonic moment, the US‐China rivalry has led to the revenge of the global governance trilemma. Moving beyond the idea of a shift from rules to power, we use the logic of the trilemma to identify three ideal‐typical scenarios for the coming world order: a world of clubs, a world of deals, and a world of thin governance.