Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Q‐learning under sequential pricing
The RAND Journal of Economics · 2021-09 · 52 (3) · 538-558
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12383 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 09.08.2021. Verfasst von Timo Klein. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 200-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 73 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Prices are increasingly set by algorithms. One concern is that intelligent algorithms may learn to collude on higher prices even in the absence of the kind of coordination necessary to establish an antitrust infringement. However, exactly how this may happen is an open question. I show how in simulated sequential competition, competing reinforcement learning algorithms can indeed learn to converge to collusive equilibria when the set of discrete prices is limited. When this set increases, the algorithm considered increasingly converges to supra‐competitive asymmetric cycles. I show that results are robust to various extensions and discuss practical limitations and policy implications.
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APA
Klein, T. (2021). Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Q‐learning under sequential pricing. The RAND Journal of Economics, 52(3), 538-558. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12383
Vancouver
Klein T. Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Q‐learning under sequential pricing. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2021;52(3):538-558. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12383
BibTeX
@article{Klein2021,
author = {Klein, Timo},
title = {Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Q‐learning under sequential pricing},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2021},
volume = {52},
number = {3},
pages = {538--558},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12383}
}
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