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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Algorithmic and Human Collusion

Tobias Werner

The Economic Journal · 27.01.2026

DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueag013 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Economic Journal, online erschienen am 27.01.2026. Verfasst von Tobias Werner. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 103 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: German Association for Experimental Economic Research.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

I study self-learning pricing algorithms and show that they are collusive in market simulations. To derive a counterfactual that resembles traditional tacit collusion, I conduct market experiments with humans in the same environment. Across different treatments, I vary the market size and the number of firms that use a pricing algorithm. I demonstrate that oligopoly markets can become more collusive if algorithms make pricing decisions instead of humans. In two-firm markets, prices are weakly increasing in the number of algorithms in the market. In three-firm markets, algorithms weaken competition if most firms use an algorithm and human sellers are inexperienced.

Förderung

  • German Association for Experimental Economic Research

Zitieren

APA

Werner, T. (2026). Algorithmic and Human Collusion. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag013

Vancouver

Werner T. Algorithmic and Human Collusion. The Economic Journal. 2026. doi:10.1093/ej/ueag013

BibTeX
@article{Werner2026,
  author = {Werner, Tobias},
  title = {Algorithmic and Human Collusion},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/ej/ueag013}
}
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