To Be a Truster or Not to Be: Evolutionary Dynamics of a Symmetric N-Player Trust Game in Well-Mixed and Networked Populations
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems · 2026-11 · 56 (11) · 7218-7231
DOI: 10.1109/tsmc.2026.3726798 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, 2026-11. Verfasst von Ik Soo Lim und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 68 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Trust and reciprocation form the foundation of economic, social, and other interactions. While the trust game (TG) is widely used to study these concepts for interactions between two players, often alternating different roles (i.e., investor and trustee), its extensions to multiplayer scenarios have been restricted to instances where players assume only one fixed role. To address this limitation, we propose a symmetric N-player TG, in which players alternate between two roles, a common feature of real-world interactions; this framework models situations in which an agent’s success in dynamic multiagent systems depends on their performance across interchangeable roles rather than in a single fixed role. The payoff of the player is defined as the average across their two roles and drives the evolutionary game dynamics. We find that the symmetric N-player TG presents a more challenging social dilemma than the well-studied public goods game (PGG), while nonlinear payoffs can promote cooperation in the latter; trust in our proposed game fails to evolve in well-mixed populations regardless of such nonlinearity. In structured populations, nonlinear payoffs, a realistic feature of many biological and social systems, can have strong impacts on the evolution of trust. Unlike existing models confined to linear payoffs, we reveal that the same nonlinearity can yield substantially different outcomes, depending on the nature of the underlying network. Notably, degree-based interventions nearly double the average social welfare, increasing the mean normalized payoff from 0.42 to 0.78 across the tested parameter space. Our results highlight the importance of considering both payoff structures and network topologies in understanding the emergence and maintenance of prosocial behaviors (e.g., trust).
Zitieren
APA
Lim, I. S., & Masuda, N. (2026). To Be a Truster or Not to Be: Evolutionary Dynamics of a Symmetric N-Player Trust Game in Well-Mixed and Networked Populations. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, 56(11), 7218-7231. https://doi.org/10.1109/tsmc.2026.3726798
Vancouver
Lim IS, Masuda N. To Be a Truster or Not to Be: Evolutionary Dynamics of a Symmetric N-Player Trust Game in Well-Mixed and Networked Populations. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems. 2026;56(11):7218-7231. doi:10.1109/tsmc.2026.3726798
BibTeX
@article{Lim2026,
author = {Lim, Ik Soo and Masuda, Naoki},
title = {To Be a Truster or Not to Be: Evolutionary Dynamics of a Symmetric N-Player Trust Game in Well-Mixed and Networked Populations},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems},
year = {2026},
volume = {56},
number = {11},
pages = {7218--7231},
doi = {10.1109/tsmc.2026.3726798}
}
EUVIMED